Showing posts with label Woods. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Woods. Show all posts

Wednesday, 20 June 2012

Day 46: If there's a contradiction, there's a contradiction

Former Imperial Tobacco marketing executive Jacques Woods arrived almost ten minutes late for his third (non-consecutive) day of testimony because he stopped in the hall just outside courtroom 1709 to have a conversation with Rothmans, Benson and Hedges lawyer Jean-François Lehoux as the rest of the lawyers and court observers sat waiting inside. When Mr Woods finally did stroll into the courtroom at almost twenty-to-ten, he stopped to greet some of the other tobacco industry lawyers with big smiles and hearty handshakes, seemingly working the industry side of the room like a politician. Once he finally settled into the witness stand, the court staff called the judge so that the day could get underway.

It didn't take long for Mr Woods to lose his jolly demeanour once plaintiff-side lawyer Bruce Johnston began questioning him. Mr Woods would spend most of the remainder of the morning frowning at Mr Johnston, the smile he had on his face while greeting the tobacco industry lawyers long gone.

Mr Johnston began by delving into the issue of whether Imperial Tobacco marketed its brands with implied health claims. Mr Woods initially insisted that Imperial never marketed its products this way, so Mr Johnston directed him to Exhibit 133. This exhibit is an April 1978 memo by Anthony Kalhok, Imperial's Director of Marketing and Mr Woods' boss, in response to a request that went to him and other senior Imperial Tobacco executives to select, from a list of fifty statements, the six with "the most important implications for the future of our tobacco business". One of the six statement that Mr Kalhok selected was option #42: "Companies will increasingly sell products for which health claims may be implied." He then wrote:
With the exception of #42, we will have to find ways and means to stall the implementation of the above or counteract their effects.
Mr Johnston pressed the witness to either provide a good explanation for what his boss apparently believed or change his testimony that Imperial did not market its products with implied health claims, but Mr Woods would do neither. Justice Riordan eventually grew impatient with the verbal dance the lawyer and witness were engaged in jumped in to cut off the line of questioning: "I don't see what trying to get into Mr Kalhok's mind is going to get us. [Mr Woods has] told you what's in his mind. If there's a contradiction, there's a contradiction."

"And I submit that there isn't", interjected Imperial Tobacco lawyer Deborah Glendinning.

"That's for me to decide," the judge replied.

Justice Riordan's intervention here pinpoints a critical issue in the case. Since the plaintiffs need to rely to a large extent on witnesses who are current and former tobacco industry executives or employees, most of whom are very partial to the defendants, there is a pattern so far of these witnesses testifying to try to minimize or deny any wrongdoing by their employers. The plaintiffs need these witnesses to get a lot documentary evidence onto the record, but they also need to counteract their minimizing or denying testimony. The main way for them to do this is to confront these witnesses with contradictory evidence, like Mr Johnston did to Mr Woods with Exhibit 133 regarding the use of implied health claims to market cigarettes. Sometimes this spurs the witnesses to change their testimony, occasionally a witness has had a good credible explanation for why the document is not what it seemed on its face but, most of the time, like in the exchange above between Mr Johnston and Mr Woods, the witness doesn't have a good explanation but won't change their story either. This is where it will ultimately fall to the judge to examine the contradictions and assess the credibility of the witnesses.

This pattern continued during the remainder of Mr Johnston's examination of Mr Woods. Judging by his words and facial expressions, Mr Woods did not seem to like being confronted with contradictions by Mr Johnston, at one point complaining that Mr Johnston's questions were wasting his time. Mr Woods seems to have a very high opinion of his own intelligence as well; at one point Mr Woods heaped praise on a former colleague as having been extremely intelligent and mentioned that he needed to ask Imperial to pay for him to get remedial statistics training to keep up with the smart young people who were coming into the marketing department in the late 1970s. When Mr Johnston summarized Mr Woods' testimony as having been that this colleague was smarter than him, Mr Woods interrupted to say "I never said he was smarter than me."

Mr Johnston came back to the issue of implied health claims by introducing Exhibits 511 and 511A. Exhibit 511 was Mr Woods' personal hand-written notes (in French, his first language) taken while going over some survey data comparing whether to market Trojan cigarettes in French as "la plus douce" (the freshest) or "la plus faible" (the mildest). Exhibit 511A was the memo he later produced on the subject (in English). Mr Woods' wrote in his notes that the survey repondents associated "la plus faible" with reduced nicotine for better health. This was the slogan he recommended.

Mr Johnston asked Mr Woods if it would be fair to say that, when he recommended "la plus faible", he did so in full awareness that some people would take this to mean it was a healthier cigarette. Mr Woods replied that, even if some people saw it that way, that was not his goal.

Exhibit 512 was a 1977 study on attitudes toward Imperial's Peter Jackson brand. Mr Johnston honed in on the following line: "Former PJ smokers could be divided into two groups. The first on (undoubtedly the largest group) remain very positive about the brand because they switched to a perceived milder brand due to health concerns." When asked by Mr Johnston if marketing had an impact on people perceiving other brands as milder, Mr Woods minimized the impact of advertising but did note that Imperial worked on developing products that tasted milder and this "seems to have succeeded with these people."

On cross-examination, Imperial Tobacco lawyer Craig Lockwood led Mr Woods to say that the reason Imperial did extensive research on teen smokers below the age of 18 was that that is the age that most brand switching occurs, so research on that age group is necessary in order to understand brand switching (although this did not explain why Exhibit 158, a test marketing plan for Player's Light codenamed "Project Huron", identified males aged 15-25 as the target audience).

Mr Lockwood also led Mr Woods to try to explain away compromising statements in memos produced when Mr Woods was part of Imperial's strategic planning group by leading him to say that ideas from the strategic planning group were often "blue sky exercises" (Mr Lockwood's words) that were never implemented.

Two Other Witnesses Return

Once Mr Woods' testimony wrapped up in the late morning, former Imperial research scientist Andrew Porter returned to wrap up his testimony as well. Mr Porter had already been cross-examined by the industry lawyers, so plaintiff lawyer Pierre Boivin was limited to redirect questioning on topics raised during cross-examination. During Imperial lawyer Deborah Glendenning's cross-examination, she led Dr Porter to minimize the health effects of smoking by pointing out that, like cigarette smoke, water and barbeque contain carcinogens. (Blurring the health risks of smoking by drawing false equivalencies between tobacco and other less harmful products, most commonly alcohol, is a common tobacco industry tactic.) Justice Riordan quickly grew impatient with Mr Boivin's questioning to establish the rather obvious fact that eating barbeque is far far less harmful to health than smoking, perhaps because by this point the morning court session was in overtime and all the talk of barbeque was reminding everyone that it was lunch time.

Mr Boivin wrapped up with Dr Porter by returning to the issue of why Imperial did not inform the public about Dr Porter's research that showed that smokers compensated for so-called light and mild cigarettes by inhaling more deeply. Dr Porter repeated his earlier answer that his audience was the scientific community, and it was the responsibility of journalists to report on the findings he published in scientific journals if they found them newsworthy.

The afternoon saw the completion of the testimony of retired Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council communications officer Jacques Lariviere. A few new exhibits came in through his testimony which, at the time of publication of this blog, are not yet posted on the plaintiffs' website. Some of these exhibits had to do with second-hand smoke, which brought on numerous objections from the industry lawyers and lengthy debates over the objections. This is because the court has previously ruled that second-hand smoke is not an issue in the trial except to the extent that the industry's conduct concerning on second-hand smoke affecting smoking rates, like efforts to dismiss or minimize the health effects of second-hand smoke to make smoking more socially acceptable.

Mr Lariviere, an older overweight man who needed to sit during his testimony, seemed to struggle with having to leave and re-enter the courtroom so many times while the lawyers debated the industry objections, but he took it with good humour joking with Justice Riordan that he needed the excercise anyway. Instructions for accessing the latest exhibits can be found at the bottom of this blog entry.

Tomorrow, the last trial day before the two month summer pause, no witnesses are scheduled, but the lawyers are scheduled to make legal arguments.

By Michael DeRosenroll for Cynthia Callard

The documents are on the web-site maintained by the Plaintiff's lawyers. To access them, it is necessary to gain entry to the web-site. Fortunately, this is easy to do.

Step 1: Click on: https://tobacco.asp.visard.ca

Step 2: Click on the blue bar on the splash-page "Acces direct a l'information/direct access to information" You will then be taken to the document data base.

Step 3: Return to this blog - and click on any links.

Tuesday, 12 June 2012

Day 41 : Market-share driven. Even to kids

For information on accessing documents, see note at the end of this post

Jacques Woods, the never-smoker who spent the first ten years of his marketing career at Imperial Tobacco, made his second appearance at the Montreal class action trials this morning.

Jacques Woods
Even at the age of 62, Mr. Wood could be described as a "strapping lad." In a notably gentle voice he provided direct and succinct answers to the questions that were put to him by plaintiff lawyer, Bruce Johnston. The morning passed in a smooth and mostly uninterrupted succession of questions and answers, many of which were focused on his verifying documents so that they could be entered into evidence.

His written work from the period, and his answers to questions about marketing today, show a detailed understanding of brand development and marketing. (See for example, Exhibit 474 in which he reaches out to a consultant formerly with from Imperial's ad firm Spitzer, Mills and Bates).

In 1980, he was selected to present the story of Imperial Tobacco's success to a BAT marketing conference. (Exhibit 299) Reflecting on the presentation today, he attributed ITL's marketing success to its approach to its customers. The whole point was to listen to consumers. Don’t sell them what you think they should have. Listen and sell them what they want. 

People differ, so selling people what they want requires a range of products that are tailored to different market segments he explained. Segmentation is a core strategy, understanding segmentation better than your competitors allows you to come with better marketing approaches and brand building strategies. 

Bruce Johnston asked whether providing smokers what they wanted meant selling them cigarettes they thought were safer. Jacques Woods didn't simplify what he saw as a more complex set of smoker needs, but in the end it seemed to boil down to the same thing - lighter cigarettes responded to the needs of smokers who wanted less. More and more the numbers became a point of reference for people.  I remember people looking at the side to see what was different in the products. ... Some people felt guilty. Some people felt it was dangerous. Probably for them [lower numbers] equated to being safer.

While Mr. Woods was at Imperial Tobacco he directed work to ensure that the package and product were coherent, and that other visual cues about taste and strength were on the package. (Exhibit 463, 465). It was important, Mr. Woods said, to make sure that the perception you had visually matched the smokers experience.

During his first appearance on May 28th, Mr. Woods had said emphatically Imperial Tobacco's policy was to never direct its marketing to youth, and that this policy was part of the reason he felt comfortable working with the company. (His concern for children is reflected in his current volunteer work with Breakfast Clubs of Canada).

That policy, and his execution of it, seems more nuanced in light of today's testimony. A number of documents showed Mr. Woods at the centre of research directed at children as young as 16 (Exhibit 464, 466, 304).

The reason it was okay to research on people as young as 16, as he eventually put it, was that kids were making brand decisions before they reached the age of 18, and Imperial Tobacco did not want to lose out on future business that represented. We had seen in prior studies that smoking was starting pretty young and brand choice consolidation starting at that time. It is probably for that reason that it was explored.

If a 16 to 18 year old was smoking, you wanted a 16 to 18 year old to smoke an imperial brand?
Yes.


Projet Jeunesse

Imperial Tobacco's Project 16 (Exhibit 142 B), which researched the smoking habits of young Canadians gained some notoriety after it was made public during the 1989 trial of the Tobacco Products Control Act. During this trial, a sister study on Quebec youth, Project Jeunesse, has come to light. Lo and behold! Mr. Woods was at the centre of this research project.

In 1977, he explained the rationale to the consumer research firm, Multi-Réso: Whereas smokers used to start around the age of 20, the average age of starting is now slipping below 16.  We have the impression that today a smoker of 16 or 17 years has already quite a history. He may be started to smoke during or even before puberty and he has already started to change brands as a result of unknown factors to do with the image or characteristics of products. (Exhibit 301B, translation).

The firm reported to Jacques Woods a research protocol (Exhibit 301 C), and the recruitment of 16 and 17 year old high school students (Exhibit 301 D). The report that was delivered has been discussed briefly before in this trial (Exhibit 301, 301 E, 304).

Like Project 16, it is a harsh condemnation of smoking by very young smokers. These high school students saw themselves as slaves (esclavages), and drug dependants. Mr. Woods remains unfazed by the results. This seemed to be normal behaviour of various age groups – it was 'same old same old.' Probably if we did the study today we would find the same things.

If there is one reason that they are negative about the cigarette, it is because it erodes their autonomy, the report concludes. One theme that would be very effective in an anti-smoking campaign directed to this group would be that of slavery to cigarettes. (Exhibit 304, translation)

Jacques Woods was asked if the information was ever shared with government, to help it design better anti-smoking campaigns for youth, but deflected any responsibility to do so. I don’t know. I don’t know whether at the CTMC level they were sharing research.

At lunchtime, Mr. Woods testimony had almost concluded. Because the trial unexpectedly did not sit this afternoon, he will likely continue his testimony for about an hour tomorrow. After that, Jacques Lariviere, formerly of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council, is scheduled to testify.

To access trial documents linked to this site:

The documents are on the web-site maintained by the Plaintiff's lawyers. To access them, it is necessary to gain entry to the web-site. Fortunately, this is easy to do.

Step 1: Click on: https://tobacco.asp.visard.ca

Step 2: Click on the blue bar on the splash-page "Acces direct a l'information/direct access to information" You will then be taken to the document data base.

Step 3: Return to this blog - and click on any links.

Monday, 28 May 2012

Day 32 - Reluctant and dissonant witnesses

For information on accessing documents, see note at the end of this post

The ten-day recess of the Montreal tobacco trials ended this morning at 9:30 when the regular crowd of lawyers, clients, court-workers and onlookers stood as Justice Brian Riordan entered the courtroom.

After a glorious week of early summer, the return to the windowless court environment may have felt particularly harsh to the first witness. Almost two months had passed since Imperial Tobacco Canada's former corporate counsel and vice president, Mr. Roger Ackman's first reluctant appearance. Resistance to his subpoena had gone as far as a request to the Court of Appeal, and his manner today suggested he was equally unenthusiastic to provide information to the court.

There were two reasons Mr. Ackman had been recalled:  Exhibit 102A and Exhibit 102B.

Roger Ackman in 1994
These two documents were provided to the plaintiffs by Imperial Tobacco only after Justice Riordan intervened. It is not surprising that there was some reluctance to put them on the court record - they tell two sides of a "heated" dispute between lawyer (Mr. Ackman) and scientist (Mr. Dunn) over the removal of ITL's scientific reports from Canada at the request of BAT.

Today, plaintiff-side lawyer Gordon Kugler wanted to ask Mr. Ackman more about the events that lead to the engagement of the Monitor Corporation / Roger Martin to mediate between the two quarelling vice-presidents. He also wanted to know what was contained on the 5 missing pages from Mr. Ackman's fax to Mr. Martin.

In a small feeble voice, Mr. Ackman gave short feeble replies. "I have no idea." "I have no recollection" "I have no recollection of seeing this document." "I don't recall Roger Martin." "I do not recall writing this memo."

Whether it was Mr. Ackman's disputed feeble state that was behind his inability to reply, or whether there was a less acceptable explanation may never be known. Recognizing, perhaps, that there was no point in questioning a dead horse, Mr. Kugler took no more than 15 minutes before announcing he had nothing mroe to ask and allowing Mr. Ackman to make his second exit from this trial.

There are other witnesses who may be able to throw some light on these events - the recipients of the memos. The plaintiffs reported that they were trying to subpoena the records from the Monitor Corporation, which is head-quartered in the United States.

"Is there anything I can do to help?" asked Justice Riordan and then inquired whether Mr. Roger Martin had been located. Yes, he was told. We have found him, but he doesn't want to talk to us.


What was not put on the court record is that this is the same Mr. Roger Martin who is now Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto.

The dissonant witness

Before the clock struck ten, the second witness had been sworn in.


Mr. Jacques Woods worked in various marketing positions at Imperial Tobacco for the first 10 years of his professional career, before leaving the company in 1984 at the age of 34.

He is now 62, but appears younger. His baby-face,  large frame, gentle manner and somewhat old-fashioned affect lend him the appearance of a boy-scout leader from a simpler era.

Plaintiff lawyer Bruce Johnston took a different approach in his first questions to Mr. Woods than he has with previous witnesses. Rather than go through the customary establishing questions, he leapt to the core of the issues he wanted Mr. Woods to address: "While you were employed, did Imperial Tobacco target youth in its advertising?"

Justice Riordan may have thought this was an oversight, and he suggested politely that it might be useful to get Mr. Woods background on the record.  "I'll get to that, your honour," said Mr. Johnston then returned to  press questions about the company's policies with respect to marketing to youth, and the way they were communicated to staff.

Clearly, Mr. Woods had also expected to be given a chance to say something about himself before answering such pointed questions. He inserted his own introductory framing to his replies.
I  joined Imperial Tobacco right after college. I joined at 24  year old in 1974. I was quite young and low on the totem pole, so I wouldn't know exactly what the policies of the organization was. All I knew was related to my function and context... Remember my age. I was on a learning curve." 
He wasted little time before telling the court that he didn't smoke, and that he worked for Imperial Tobacco as he might have for WonderBra or Dr. Ballards (pet food company) or other products that he did not use himself. He had three sons, he said proudly, suggesting that this explained why he would not have agreed to work for a company that marketed cigarettes to youth.

If he sounded like he was excusing his choice in working for Imperial Tobacco, he did not extend any shame towards the company. Throughout the day he spoke respectfully - at times admiringly - of those who were higher on the totem pole. He referred frequently to the changed context after so many decades, but even then made no direct criticisms of the policies or practices of a company he had left after only 10 years employment.

In response to Mr. Wood's clear statement that neither he nor the company had directed marketing to youth, Mr. Johnston pointed to several documents that suggested a very different practice, including some Mr. Woods had authored:
  • Exhibit 347 - a letter from the Creative Research Group, proposing research on campaigns, which notes "du  Maurier has successfully extended its franchise and broadened it to include more younger smokers."
    (The wording of that was a little strange, said Mr. Woods).
  • Exhibit 303 - the first of the CRY series, which had worked with focus groups of teenagers aged 15-18 and used this research to develop guidelines on marketing to youth.
    (I think most of the elements there were probably used as guidelines in further communications, said Mr. Woods)
  • Exhibit 142B - Project 16 which, in its many observations about young smokers found that "serious attempts to learn to smoke occur between ages 12 and 13."
    (When asked if this caused him personal concern, Mr. Woods replied that "Not a concern. A fact. A reality. This is the life we live in." He said he was not aware of any discussions at Imperial Tobacco of what they could do to prevent youth smoking.)
  • Exhibit 350 - a questionnaire on advertising recall, where Mr. Woods had extended the proposed age categories to include 15-19 year olds
    ("If I had been in the company longer, I would have written 'young adults'", Mr. Woods explained)
  • Exhibit 351 - a proposal from Mr. Woods for research to increase acceptance of Player's Filter cigarettes among young people.
  • Exhibit 140 - where the research guidelines had been amended to include participants as  young as 15 (Mr. Woods wasn't sure that the handwritten annotation to reduce the age had been made by him).

And then there were two?

The trial has already received documents prepared within the strategic planning group (Exhibit 266267314), but this was the first occasion to question a member of that team.  The three staff people in this "Think Function" were Jacques Woods, Bob Bexon and Maurice Bédard, and they reported to Wayne Knox ("one of the smartest people I knew" according to Mr. Woods).

Bruce Johnston showed Mr. Woods about a memo Mr. Bexon wrote to Wayne Knox in 1984, a few months after Mr. Woods had left the company (Exhibit 267).  It proposed a rather cynical strategy to keep smoking rates high by changing public attitudes and engaging in activities to encourage young people to smoke. He asked the witness and whether it reflected his own understanding of the marketing situation.

It says more about the way Bob Bexon thought.

You worked closely with him for 4 years, was that the sort of thing he expressed?
 He was very different in his interpretation - with the same facts, same logic, he would write differently. He read the reality different

He went on to be president?
Yeah, he did it. I left and did something else.


Bob Bexon, who left Imperial Tobacco to work for its American sister-company (Brown and Williamson) and returned as president around the time these law suits were initiated was killed in a bicycle accident in 2008. Mr. Knox's whereabouts have been unknown (some have thought he also died).  So when Mr. Woods stated that he still had a high regard for Wayne Knox, Mr. Johnston quickly wanted to know more about this other potential witness.

Mr. Knox is still alive? Yes.

Do you know wher he lives? Jacques Woods looked over at the Imperial Tobacco lawyers before answering "Somewhere in Thailand."

Horse sense

Several times over his testimony, Mr. Woods volunteered or was asked about the use of horses in cigarette advertisements.  Project 16 (Exhibit 142B) had found that the Players' horse ad was considered effective with young people as it showed "simple, honest things."  Mr. Woods had earlier recognized the power of these animals for marketing cigarettes, proposing research on  "the appeal of 'horse' subjects as well as the appeal and meaning of horses in general." (Exhibit 354)

Horses, he told the court, were embedded in the promotion of the world's most popular cigarettes, Marlboro. He said that if they weren't used in Canada on cigarette ads, it wasn't because of concerns that they were popular with youth, but because of trademark concerns.

The horses in Marlboro and Players ads ride in wild open spaces - they are "uninhibited and free" as teenagers told the research firms.   At several points today, Mr. Woods sounded like a horse of a different colour -- a  work-horse whose blinkers kept him focused only on what the rider wanted him to see, unaware of the full picture around him.

The thespian judge

Amateur theatrics are part of Justice Riordan past, which may have contributed to his choosing a quote from Moliere's Tartuffe to set the scene for his ruling to dismiss claims of solicitor-client privilege over research commissioned by the industry and conducted by history professor David Flaherty.

Avant que de parler prenez-moi ce mouchoir. ..
Couvrez ce sein que je ne saurais voir:
Par de pareils objets les âmes sont blessées,
Et cela fait venir de coupables pensées.

(Before you speak, pray take this handkerchief...
Cover up that bosom, which I can’t
Endure to look on. Things like that offend
Our souls, and fill our minds with sinful thoughts.)

In his decision, Justice Riordan reflects on the widespread availability of the document that Imperial Tobacco wanted excluded from the trial. Would  it  not be absurd, and tend to make a mockery of the process, to expect the Court to turn its head in falsely pious modesty and exclaim cachez-moi ce document que je ne saurais voir, while everyone else in  the courtroom, including the class members, journalists and the public in general, are reading it on their Blackberries? He sees no alternative but to dismiss the objection and  peek under the handkerchief.

It's safe to say that Moliere is a little more read in Montreal than in London, New York or Tokyo where the parent companies of the Canadian tobacco firms that are on trial are located. So perhaps the message contained in his choice of the uber-hypocrite Tartuffe to represent the company's position will sail over a few legal heads in those cities.

But the reference will not be lost on his colleagues at Montreal's Court of Appeal, to which this like so many of his rulings is destined to be referred.

Although there are more questions for Jacques Woods, he will not be appearing tomorrow. Mr. Andrew Porter, formerly of Imperial Tobacco's research department, is scheduled to testify.

To access trial documents linked to this site:

The documents are on the web-site maintained by the Plaintiff's lawyers. To access them, it is necessary to gain entry to the web-site. Fortunately, this is easy to do.

Step 1: Click on: https://tobacco.asp.visard.ca

Step 2: Click on the blue bar on the splash-page "Acces direct a l'information/direct access to information" You will then be taken to the document data base.

Step 3: Return to this blog - and click on any links.