Thursday 19 December 2013

Day 196: The third witness on the kiln-conversion match

Today was the last day of hearings in the Montreal tobacco trials before the three-week Christmas break. You will forgive me for arriving at the courtroom hoping that the day would end at noon, so that I could get a jump on the holiday. (And a little more forgiveness, I hope, for the late posting of my report on the day.**)

As it turns out, it was a most interesting day - and one that flew by all too quickly.

A last minute addition

The witness was Mr. Robert Robitaille - a now-retired engineer who worked at Imperial Tobacco from 1978 to 2011. During his career with the company, he rose through management positions on the production side of the business. It was he who was in charge of production in south-west Ontario at the time that the growers were being told by the three tobacco manufacturers to change the way they cured tobacco.

The story of this "kiln conversion" and the way it was intended to reduce the quantities of tobacco specific nitrosamines (TSNAs) has already been told by witnesses from the other two defendant companies: Mr. Gentry (JTI-Macdonald) and by Mr. Chapman (PMI/Rothmans, Benson and Hedges). Imperial Tobacco, however, had not included this chapter in the story line of its defence.

It is not clear to me whether Mr. Robitaille's testimony was intended to replace that of his colleague, Jim Sinclair, who has been on and off the list all year. It could have been that Imperial Tobacco wanted to make sure that the judge understood that they too had "done the right thing" when presented with an opportunity to reduce the levels of one toxin in tobacco. 

A third possibility is that it was felt that an additional witness was necessary to fill in the cracks in the story that Justice Riordan had identified at the end of Mr. Chapman's testimony.  "If you knew that the new type of tobacco was safer, why didn't you start using right away, why did you wait the two years?" the judge had asked at the end of the day.

If Ms. Roberts had been able to stop Mr. Robitaille's testimony after the answer to that one question had been given, she might have felt that the last hearing day of the year was better than some. But with this witnesses' surprisingly candid answers under cross-examination -- and some killer documents he had been forced to bring with him to the trial -- it was the plaintiffs team that left the court grinning from ear to ear.

Why the delay? It was too big a task to be done any quicker

It took very little more than an hour for Imperial Tobacco's counsel, Ms. Nancy Roberts, to get Mr. Robitaille to put on record the reasons that the it took a few years after the kiln conversion process began (in 2001) for all of its cigarettes to be made with the lower-TSNA tobacco.

To begin with, the logistics were challenging. There were 1,300 farmers involved, and 13,000 kilns to convert. "It's not like buying a 13,000 Ford Escapes off the lot," Mr. Robitaille explained. The technology was new, and there were only a few suppliers of the equipment. There were particularities to each farm, and many bugs in that had to be worked out. "It was a massive undertaking". 

The power to make key decisions was not held by the companies. Ontario law gave the Ontario Flue Cured Tobacco Marketing Board authority over the sale of tobacco, meaning that any process involving farmers had to be determined collectively.

The industry-government membership
of the Tobacco Advisory Committee
These discussions were coordinated by the Tobacco Advisory Committee (TAC). It was this body that had the legal mandate to "discuss volume and also any other topics related to growing of tobacco in Ontario." 

Surprising to me was the high level of government representation in this process. The TAC "was chaired by the assistant deputy minister of agriculture from Ontario," and was composed of "representatives from the marketing board, representatives from ITL, JTI, RBH, the export dealers association of Ontario plus Agriculture Canada representatives."

Mr. Robitaille explained that another major challenge to the kiln conversion was the cost - over $80 million. The TAC originally proposed that the cost be shared evenly by all of the four sectors represented on the committee: 25% paid by the Ontario government, 25% paid by the federal government, 25% by the leaf purchasers (cigarette manufacturers and exporters) and 25% by the farmers.

A stand-off over picking up the tab.

Despite a prolonged lobbying effort, however, the federal government declined the invitation to participate. "The federal government never gave any money," said Mr. Robitaille. "The provincial government gave $20 million, the companies gave $20 million and the growers ended up with the rest."

Bob Speller, former MP
for Haldimand-Norfolk
Ms. Roberts asked Mr. Robitaille to elaborate on the efforts spent by the TAC and its members to get the federal government to kick-in its share. The local member of parliament, Bob Speller, championed the cause (Exhibit 21057), and letters and representations were made by all of the TAC stakeholders.

The sticking point within the federal government seemed to be Health Canada. Alan Rock was the health minister at that time, but it was Deputy Minister, David Dodge, who gave federal funding the kiss of death when he sidestepped the pressure from the TAC to say that the kiln conversion would be a good health move. (Exhibit 20031, 20032, 21058). 

Imperial Tobacco's view that federal funds should be provided was a factor in the company delaying announcing its own contribution. "At the beginning, we held up our commitment by saying we wanted the governments to be at the table, since they were the main stakeholder in the tobacco business - we wanted them to pay their fair share. So we held back until the Ontario Government committed twenty million dollars."

It was only when planting season was on the horizon that a "Heads of Agreement" was reached in April 2001 between the TAC and the growers that involved commitments for kiln conversions. (Exhibit 21059). At that point it was known that the 2001 target to change over all of the kilns would not be met, and that only 25% of their crop would be treated by the new curing process. By the following year, all kilns had been converted.

Mr. Roberts asked Mr. Robitaille to explain why the companies did not use the other options that might be available to them, such as refusing to buy any tobacco that was not cured in the new barns, or by importing the tobacco they used.

Her witness explained that the (government-mandated) auction system was anonymized in ways that would not let the manufacturers know which tobacco came from which farms. So they could not be selective about which tobacco they bought.

The reason that they could not buy their tobacco from outside Canada, he said, was because that would not be acceptable to government, as it would be the death-knell for the sector.  "You just could not say 'we are going to buy zero this year and come back the following year' because there would be nothing to come back to."

And as for the decision to keep the newer reduced-toxin tobacco on the shelf while the older tobaccos were used up, Mr. Robitaille said this was in consideration of giving smokers a better tasting cigarette. He said tobacco was subject to "a sweat" in which it was warehoused for one full season. "You do aging with wine, well, the same principle applies to this agricultural product. When you do age the tobacco, it does change the sensory characteristics of it."

More documents? Yes! (But not if it means delays)

"Those are my questions." Little more than an hour had passed since Ms. Roberts began her questions before she sat down.

The three documents that she had introduced as exhibits all dated from after 2001 - which is later than the cut-off date for the "production" of documents that were shared among the parties at an earlier stage in the trial.

This triggered the plaintiffs to demand that the companies hand over more recent documents that were related to the kiln conversation program. The proof can't be restricted to the documents that the defendants choose, Justice Riordan was reminded by plaintiff lawyer, Philippe Trudel.

The judge agreed. He seemed to take the defendants by surprise when he ordered that, having raised this issue, they provide all of the relevant documents to the plaintiffs.

More production! And so late in the trial?! Nancy Roberts said it couldn't be done in the time frame Justice Riordan had offered. She threatened to go launch an appeal. Her sabre rattling seemed to have been effective at dampening Mr. Trudel's enthusiasm for new documents: The day ended with his suggestion that the request would be withdrawn in return for two documents, one each from JTI-Macdonald and Imperial.

The damning dozen

Mr. Trudel may have felt he had all the documents he needed to counter the view that the kiln conversion program was an example of Imperial Tobacco acting in the interests of its customers.

This was because he had (unusually) exercised his right to ask the witness to bring with him relevant documents that he had in his possession (subpoena duces tecum). Happily for the plaintiffs, Mr. Robitaille had plenty of interesting documents in his possession, as he had asked for material to be sent to him to help him review in preparation for his testimony. From these documents, Mr. Trudel selected a dozen to introduce as exhibits.

Safer sources

Memos written by Mr. Robitaille's staff showed that Imperial Tobacco knew that Canadian tobacco was higher in TSNAs than material imported from Brazil, Zimbabwe and India. (Tobacco in those countries was cured in kilns which were indirectly heated by wood fires, a practice that had been abandoned in North America.) (Exhibit 1666, 1667). 

So why not buy lower TSNA tobacco from those other countries?  Mr. Robitaille admitted it would have been possible -- and even cheaper. "we would have saved a lot of money – but by doing that we would have bankrupted an area of southwestern Ontario. ... it was not right to do that."  

Earlier he had said that "the right thing to do" was to reduce the TSNAs from tobacco if it could be done.  Mr. Trudel pressed him to reconcile these two opposing objectives:  - protecting Canadian farm jobs or reducing smokers' exposure to TSNAs?  Mr. Robitaille suggested that the choice was not one the company was free to make. "No government in those days would have let those farming communities go down the drain."

Trying to manipulate government

Imperial Tobacco's ambition in 2001 went beyond changing the way that tobacco was cured, and the kiln conversion program was a mechanism it hoped to use as leverage towards other goals.

The company saw that getting the federal government to endorse the change would help protect it litigation. "Government responsibility to a legal product could be inherited. An opportunity for the Manufacturers exists to spread product liability." (Exhibit 1668) And there were other "spin offs" they could work towardssuch as re-engaging Agriculture Canada as a research partner. (Exhibit 1669).


Putting the squeeze on Health Canada
Exhibit 1670.1
Notes from the TAC suggest that it was the company that designed the approach to the federal government, which was aimed at boxing Health Canada into having to say yes. (Exhibits 1670, 1670.1)


Trying to manipulate the growers

Imperial Tobacco also saw the kiln conversion program as a way to get rid of the marketing board and to introduce direct contracts between manufacturer and farmers. (Exhibit 1668, 1673).

The company's approach to the farmers was today described by Mr. Robitaille as "a hard line." The notes he wrote after meeting the farmers in February 2001 describe a frightened and angry grower community, who felt "they have been used like a pawn in a chess game between government and companies."  

Even then - and with only weeks to growing season -- Imperial Tobacco stood firm against the pressure to make its own financial commitment to the conversion program. Mr. Robitaille had noted that "We reinforced our position of : No financing for TSNA, Contract long-term solution." (Exhibit 1673)

When Mr. Trudel asked him "Why didn't you offer the money as soon as possible?" Mr. Robitaille gave a bottom-line response. "If we had done so, the Ontario government would not have given any money." 

Lots of choice on the plant

The last of Mr. Robitaille's documents presented by Mr. Trudel was an addendum to the "Head Agreement" that Ms. Roberts had shown earlier in the day. (Exhibit 21059, 21059.1). The addendum gave the small print on the negotiated contract between tobacco buyers and sellers for the 2001 crop year.

Exhibit 21059.1
Among the issues negotiated were the quantities of each type of leaves the Canadian manufacturers and the Canadian tobacco exporter planned to buy from the farmers. This information directly contradicts the version of events that Valerie Dyer had presented earlier this month -- that the companies had no control over which types of tobacco leaves were available for sale at the auction house.

As this fact sunk in, Philip Trudelle asked Mr. Robitaille a question that indirectly asked him to similarly contradict ITL's position that it was the government that determined the nicotine levels in cigarettes. Did the government ever tell you what grade or plant position you should buy or how you should blend them?"
"No" said Mr. Robitaille.

There were only a few more questions before Mr. Robitaille was invited to step down.

Burns II

Justice Riordan tied off the hanging threads related to the request by the plaintiffs for Dr. David Burns to be allowed to testify as an expert in rebuttal of the criticisms of Monograph 13 by Michael Dixon. (The issue was first discussed on December 5, 2013)

Simon Potter again lead the attempt to dislodge Dr. Burns as a witness for this purpose - arguing that the short report that had been prepared to Justice Riordan's tight specifications was still too broad for the purpose. Justice Riordan seemed sympathetic about his concerns about one paragraph of the report, which the plaintiffs agreed to cut from the report before being asked to do so. But the bulk of his objections were disgarded, and Dr. Burns has again been cleared to testify in this trial. He is now the first identified witness in the plaintiffs' counter-proof.

Simon Potter was directed to report back on January 13th and say whether the defence teams will hire another expert to respond to Dr. Burns.

Merry Christmas to you too!

Despite some attempts to laugh about a Christmas truce, there weren't many signs of seasonal good will between the men and women who are entering their second winter in this trial. Both sides still kept to themselves as they made their customary exit down separate elevators.

Justice Riordan joked that a settlement would be "The Miracle on Notre-Dame Street," and wished everyone "good rest, health and peace in the new year."  It's a nice thought.

The Supreme Court says "no".  Again. 

We now have an eleventh court decision against attempts by British American Tobacco and RJ-Reynolds to be exempted from provincial governments' cost recovery suits. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled today that it will not entertain an appeal of Ontario courts' decisions that kept those companies in.
 
The Montreal tobacco trial resumes on January 13th.
** This post was made on December 22, and back-dated to the date of the events reported.

Monday 16 December 2013

Day 195: Dr. James Hogg and Medical Mendicants

It was a mind-numbing minus 20 degrees outside the courtroom at the Montreal's Palais de Justice where Justice Riordan sat in front of a small crowd of lawyers and a camera.

Thirty-seven hundred kilometers away, 3 hours earlier and in a city 30 degrees warmer, Dr. James Hogg also sat in front of a camera as he became the 64th witness at the Montreal tobacco trials.

Dr. James Hogg
Like many of the witnesses who preceded him, Dr. Hogg, at 78 years of age, is well past the usual retirement age. But this man shows no sign of having stepped beyond a lifetime's work looking for - if not finding - the missing link between the damage that is caused to the lining of the airways to the lung and the lung disease that is caused by smoking.

Unless the video conference feed is particularly flattering, Dr. Hogg is an extremely vibrant and youthful septuagarian. So it was not physical frailty that prevented this witness from testifying in person, instead of by video-conference.

It was a different kind of vulnerability that made him refuse to come to Montreal - or even to testify anywhere until he was forced to do so by an order of the British Columbia court system. (Apparently there is not the same type of a reciprocal arrangement between British Columbia and Quebec for subpoenas, as there is between Quebec and some other provinces).

The reason given for Dr. Hogg's insistence on the mountain coming to him was, as explained by Imperial Tobacco counsel Craig Lockwood that "he receives funding from a body that says that if anybody assists or testifies on behalf of a tobacco company, they can lose their funding. And so he is not in a position to put either his endorsement or,  more importantly, his PhD students at risk, so he is not willing to."  (These provisions of the American Thoracic Society are Exhibit 20255).

(No such reason would have prevented him from testifying against tobacco companies, which he nonetheless refused to do even after being asked by the State of Vermont in 2007.)

The piper and his tune

His qualms about the way that his current funder would perceive his actions - and the hoops he was prepared to go in order to protect financing  - was thus our first introduction to this man.

This was more than a tad ironic introduction, given that the apparent aim of the defendants' counsel in asking him to testify was to demonstrate that when he received money from the tobacco industry, there were no conditions or pressure being put on the recipients.

It was Imperial Tobacco's lawyer, Ms. Nancy Roberts, who was in Vancouver and who was given the task of highlighting the illustrious career of Dr. Hogg, the high opinion he had of other CTMC grantees, the value of his research to medicine, and the complete independence his tobacco industry patrons gave him in reporting his findings.

(It was while watching Ms. Roberts long distance that I received a note from a reader of last Thursday's blog who was quite confident that the signature and address of the woman who had written the Minister of Health in 1985 to implore him to introduce bans on tobacco advertising was indeed the same Ms. Nancy Roberts who is now representing Imperial Tobacco.  I found myself liking Ms. Roberts a little more, knowing that at least at one point in her life she seems to have understood that "If the tobacco companies show they have no conscience then the government must set an example.")

Fifty years of accomplishments

Graduating in Medicine in 1962, Dr. Hogg has had a medical career that is older than many of the lawyers working on this file!

The story of his early career that he told the court yesterday is glowingly captured in a film produced to accompany his induction to the Canadian Medical Hall of Fame. But induction to this pantheon is only one of many accolades this man has received.

Even the UBC lab he set up had been named after him. And yet! True to the theme of today's testimony about the relationship between funder and fundee, Dr. Hogg reported that the UBC James Hogg Research Centre had recently been renamed, and  "switched to the Centre for Heart and Lung Innovation recently in the hope that they are going to get a donor."

Fifteen years of medical research grants

It was the receipt by Dr. James Hogg of research grants from the CTMC that was the focus of most of Ms. Roberts questions. A summary of the grants made by the CTMC from 1968 to 1986 (when it stopped providing these grants) was conveniently provided in Exhibit 21045. The table at the end of this post presents the grantees, together with an inflation-adjusted statement of their awards.

Dr. Hogg was one of the major recipients. Of the $4.8 million in CTMC grants awarded between 1971 and 1986, Dr. Hogg's share was $1.2 million, or around 25%. The largest amount of money went to the McGill University research laboratory where Dr. Hogg was based until he moved to the University of British Columbia in 1977. In addition to the money it received when Dr. Hogg was based in Montreal, the Meakins-Christie Laboratory and its other associated researchers received $2 million in grants between 1968 and 1986. 

They were a worthy lot!  From Dr. Hogg's testimony, it would appear that the CTMC allocated its money only to "outstanding researchers."  Dr. Thurlbeck was "a great scientist"  Dr. Munro was "an outstanding clinician." Dr. Modovy - "an outstanding teacher." Malcolm King - "an excellent researcher." (The same Dr. King, it would appear, as is the scientific director of the CIHR Institute on Aboriginal People's Health - Exhibit 21048.)

The trial has already heard of some of the more controversial recipients of CTMC funds  -- Hans Selye, Verner Knott and Theodore Sterling -- but Dr. Hogg seemed to have no views on the qualities of these men.

Asking Paul to pay Peter

Lawyer Pierre Boivin represented the plaintiffs during Dr. Hogg's testimony, and he drew attention to one reason that McGill may have been favoured by the CTMC and its largest donor company, Imperial Tobacco. The head of the facility, Dr. Macklem, was a "lifelong friend" of the brother of the man who ran Imperial Tobacco.

In a memoir of the Meakins Christie Laboratories, Peter Macklem recalls that " Almost as soon as I was appointed, Peter Paré, my lifelong friend and professional colleague, told me that his brother, Paul Paré, then a vice president of Imperial Tobacco, was going to be made president. He suggested that we
approach Paul to support respiratory research at the RVH. [Royal Victoria Hospital] Our pitch was that the tobacco industry was causing lung/disease and that since it was incapable of undertaking research into the diseases it was causing, it should support the research of scientists who could investigate how smoking led to disease. Paul, a man of great integrity, agreed. This led to negotiations with the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturer’s Council, the consortium of Canadian tobacco companies. They agreed to donate $300,000 to McGill to build new laboratories for respiratory research and to provide overhead costs for the first 10 years of operation." (Exhibit 1663)

Family ties

Dr. Peter Paré, pere, was a colleague of Dr. Hogg's at the Meakens-Christie institute, and Dr. Peter Paré, fils, followed today's witness to Vancouver to continue research in the same area.

But the Paré clan were not the only reference today to close relationships between prominent families in tobacco and medicine.

Early in his research career, Dr. Hogg had accepted the invitation to tour BAT's research facilities in the United Kingdom. There he met the head of BAT's research department, the chemist Geoffrey Felton. "We became friends," Dr. Hogg said. "His daughter was a medical student who did an elective in Canada. She spent a Christmas with us. I still exchange Christmas cards with her."

What gets published.... and what does not

Ms. Roberts drew attention to Dr. Hogg's success as a published researcher, and the fact that much of his work had been accepted by prestigious journals with "high impact factors." (Exhibits 20191; 20192; 20193; 20195; 20196; 20197; 20198; 20199; 20200; 20203).

PubMed shows more than 350 peer-reviewed articles on lung issues authored or co-authored by Dr. Hogg. If the CTMC is acknowledged as a funder on any of these papers, it is not picked up by the PubMed search engine.

It seemed important to Ms. Roberts to have Dr. Hogg say on the record that the CTMC had never attempted to have him alter his findings, or ever prevented him from publishing his findings. "No," said Dr. Hogg to such questions. And a firm "no" again when she asked whether any grants he received came "with strings attached."

She asked him to dispel any impression that might have been left after testimony last spring from Dr. Bilimoria, that there were associations with industry which were not disclosed, or authorship that was not made public. Dr. Hogg comfortably said that such omissions were not uncommon or out of place.

Dr. Hogg explained that it was the "coinciding" of Mr. Bilimoria's focus on enzymes and Dr. Hogg's focus on morphology that had brought these two men to work more closely together. And ti was the availability of equipment for animal experimentation at McGill that was the trigger for Dr. Bilimoria's relocation to the University setting.

The relationship between employee scientist Bilimoria and grantee scientist Hogg was a "normal, scientific exchange" and "a good atmosphere for research" said Dr. Hogg. There was no attempt of either man to influence the work of the other.

Susceptibility and causality 

Dr. Hogg stated clearly and emphatically that smoking causes lung cancer and lung disease, but he was more nuanced in his description of the degree or nature of harm that it causes than I have heard other physicians describe it.

After decades of research, he continues to explore why it is that "some people who decline rapidly have smoked no more than other people who have smoked whose function remains nearly normal."

He said that there is a picture that is often shown that depicts "someone celebrating their 100 anniversary smoking a cigarette." (I have not seen this picture - have you?). He noted that "some people can smoke heavily and their lungs don't deteriorate very much."  He described as a "minority" those who are susceptible to lung disease.

"Everybody should stop smoking, but those people [who are susceptible] in particular have to stop. Also they are the people that you need to treat early if you are going to have any chance to prevent the decline."  He did not mention how such a distinction would serve those who were not susceptible to COPD, but were vulnerable to pancreatic cancer, heart disease or other consequences of smoking.

Ms. Roberts asked whether the focus on genetic factors is a deflect - a way to create controversy over whether or not smoking caused disease. Dr. Hogg disagrees with that view because "it just closes down a whole area of research that is actually being quite productive at the moment."

Commissioned research for RJ-Reynolds

Although the CTMC ceased funding Dr. Hogg after 1986, he said today that he continued to receiving funding from the RJ-Reynolds company until the mid 1990s.

Mr. Kevin Laroche represents the company that has succeeded RJR in Canada. He was the second and last industry lawyer to ask questions of this witness, and he invited Dr. Hogg to agree with him that these subsequent funds were designed to allow his research to continue. Again, Dr. Hogg agreed. The suggestion was left that this research undertaking for the one American company was no different than the research supported by CTMC grants, which Dr. Hogg had described as a "competitive" and "investigator-initiated" grant process.  (Exhibit 40415, 40416, 40417).

The paper that was written as a result of this research was never published, however. None of the journals it had been submitted to agreed to consider it for publication "because it had been supported by industry." 

It was only under cross-examination by Mr. Boivin that it was shown that this work was related to the development of the Eclipse cigarette. (The research itself has apparently disappeared -- certainly Mr. LaRoche did not offer it, even after Mr. Boivin's suggestion).

Mr. Boivin also pointed out the condition on the funding from RJ-Reynolds that they be provided with advance notice of any publications. This countered his earlier testimony that there had been no conditions on such funds, and Mr. LaRoche later made the point that this condition applied only to the desire of the company to protect its patent rights.

No regrets

Dr. Hogg had not volunteered this information, nor had he spoken much about about the expressions of concern over the course of his career related to his relationships to tobacco companies, other than to acknowledge that there were  "anti smoking activists" and had been demonstrators "pickets and so on" outside the university where he was based.

The rules of research funding have changed markedly since Dr. Hogg first received money from the Canadian tobacco industry. The change started in Australia in the mid 1990s, he told the court, and in some universities researchers now "run the risk of losing the job at the university if you accept funding."

For that reason, he had asked Ms. Roberts to put on the record that he had returned the cheque that she had been required under Quebec procedural law to provide him with to cover his expenses to testify.

But he expressed no agreement with the changing rules. When asked about views that his engagement with tobacco companies might be seen as unethical, he said simply that "We live in a free society and everyone is entitled to their opinion. I disagree."

There is a telling image on the video prepared by the Canadian Medical Hall of Fame. It shows a young James Hogg in a Huckleberry Finn moment, standing between two other young boys. Clasped in his mouth is a cigarette. Other physicians might have chosen another photo to be remembered by.

The young James Hogg, centre
Dr. Hogg's testimony ended a day earlier than expected. "You've won the lottery!" said Justice Riordan as he thanked this witness warmly.

The trial resumes on Thursday for its last day of hearings in 2013. The witness will be Mr. Robert Robitaille.





Recipients of medical research grants from the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council.
Taken from Exhibit 21045

Year
Amount
Institution
Researcher
$2013 equiv.
1972
$18,000
Hotel Dieu
$99,283
1965
$21,300
Manitoba
Modovy
$155,024
1967
$45,000
McGill
Thurlbeck
$302,459
1968
$300,000
McGill
Macklem
$1,942,110
1971
$98,550
McGill
Hogg
$571,777
1971
$2,100
McGill
Reininger
$12,184
1971
$1,650
McGill
Thurlbeck
$9,573
1972
$54,000
McGill
Meakins Christie Laboratories
$297,848
1973
$119,300
McGill
Hogg
$606,354
1975
$107,360
McGill
Hogg
$443,128
1978
$20,460
McGill
Bilimoria/ Ecobichon
$66,931
1978
$42,548
McGill
Macklem
$139,187
1978
$57,476
McGill
Richardson
$188,021
1979
$19,850
McGill
Ecobichon / Bilimoria
$59,550
1979
$73,240
McGill
Macklem / Martin / King
$219,720
1979
$54,417
McGill
Zorychta / Richardson
$163,251
1980
$21,230
McGill
Ecobichon / Bilimoria
$57,518
1980
$102,080
McGill
Macklem / Martin / King
$276,565
1980
$62,524
McGill
Zorychta / Richardson
$169,396
1981
$24,200
McGill
Bilimoria
$58,136
1981
$114,923
McGill
King
$276,080
1981
$69,472
McGill
Zorychta 
$166,893
1982
$32,289
McGill
Bilimoria
$70,542
1982
$88,808
McGill
King
$194,019
1982
$69,368
McGill
Zorychta
$151,548
1983
$35,518
McGill
Bilimoria / Ecobichon
$73,920
1983
$94,446
McGill
Meakins Christie Laboratories
$196,561
1983
$110,242
McGill
Zorychta
$229,436
1984
$100,000
McGill
Ecobichon / Bilimoria
$201,310
1984
$47,223
McGill
Macklem
$95,065
1984
$79,254
McGill
Zorychta
$159,546
1985
$100,000
McGill
Meakins Christie Laboratories
$193,400
1985
$83,780
McGill
Zorychta
$162,031
1986
$100,000
McGill
Meakins Christie Laboratories
$185,240
1976
$127,980
McGill / Université de Montreal
Hogg / Witschi
$496,575
1977
$100,422
McGill / Université de Montreal / University of British Columbia
Hogg/Witschi, Inoue
$358,025
1968
$10,000
Montreal General Hospital
Burgess
$64,737
1968
$13,705
Ontario Veterinary College
$88,722
1970
$9,000
Queens
Wan
$54,265
1968
$25,000
Royal Edward Chest Hospital
$161,843
1971
$14,340
Royal Edward Chest Hospital
Munro
$83,199
1977
$29,194
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$104,082
1978
$11,000
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$35,984
1979
$39,750
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$119,250
1980
$37,655
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$102,019
1981
$42,925
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$103,119
1982
$86,789
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$189,608
1983
$219,011
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$455,806
1984
$58,996
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$118,765
1985
$66,794
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$129,180
1986
$88,603
Royal Ottawa Hospital
Knott
$164,128
1969
$300,000
Université de Montréal
Selye
$1,854,270
1972
$300,000
Université de Montréal
Selye
$1,654,710
1977
$20,000
Université de Montréal
Renaud
$71,304
1978
$35,500
Université de Montréal
Renaud
$116,131
1979
$35,000
Université de Montréal
Renaud
$105,000
1980
$32,000
Université de Montréal
Renaud
$86,698
1981
$30,000
Université de Montréal
Renaud
$72,069
1971
$18,900
University of British Columbia
Harrison
$109,656
1978
$40,000
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$130,852
1979
$60,000
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$180,000
1980
$63,351
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$171,637
1981
$72,490
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$174,143
1982
$73,688
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$160,986
1984
$128,930
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$259,549
1983
$81,056
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$168,694
1985
$92,726
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$179,332
1986
$96,006
University of British Columbia
Hogg
$177,842
1986
$56,000
Sterling
$103,734
Total
$4,887,419


$16,799,516